N UMEROUS reports confirm the unequivocally superior sensitivity of hydrogen gas as used electrometrically for the detection of both left-to-right and right-to-left circulatory shunts when the aberrant flow is not clearly definable by oxygen studies.'-8 When used according to any one of the several described methods, in addition to superior sensitivity and immediate recognition of a shunt, it offers reduced complexity of procedure and interpretation and much greater economy than other agents and methods. No special equipment is needed beyond a platinum-tipped or coated electrode catheter, a conventional anesthesia mask-bag-valve, and a $6.00 tank of industrial hydrogen with reducing valve. This quantity of gas is sufficient to permit the recording of several thousand diagnostic curves. For the identification of right-to-left shunts, instead of the anesthetic mask-bag-valve, we have utilized hydrogenated ascorbic acid5 and measured its arrival time in the arterial periphery by means of a platinized tip within an artery to which a second electrocardiographic preamplifier is attached.
Wider acceptance of the manifold advantages of hydrogen technics, especially when combined with oximetry for the purpose of quantitation, has been delayed by an understandable reluctance to introduce an explosive gas into the diagnostic laboratory. In an ex-cellent review of the method and results of one facet of its use, Hugenholtz et al. stated, "The danger of explosion inherent in the handling of hydrogen and the hazards of an intracardiac electrode may have precluded its general acceptance thus far."6
The danger in using an intracardiac electrode for hydrogen sensing is certainly no greater than that inherent in the utilization of ascorbic acid for shunt detection. Such risk is considered extremely remote, if indeed it does actually exist, provided the patient and all apparatus to which he is connected are attached to a common ground35 9-1' and provided a good quality conventional electrocardiographic preamplifier with capacitance-coupled input stage is attached to the intracardiac electrode. It is of course basic that all equipment be provided with an isolation transformer.
The risk in using an explosive gas, however, is less readily dismissed. Since hydrogen and air mixtures ranging from 4.1 to 74.2 per cent hydrogen are explosive,'2 its use in a hospital carries the implied requirement of conformity to The Code for Use of Flammable Anesthetics.'3 This would mean, in addition to multiple other requirements, that for greatest safety all electrical apparatus used in cardiac catheterization should be explosion-proof. Usually, this is quite impracticable. Yet those who have been experienced in the use of hydrogen have stated that when hydrogen is used, the same precautions should be observed as with any flammable anesthetic gas.5 14 Perhaps they, as we, were impressed with the recommendation of The National Fire Protection Association that when hydrogen is used within a closed building, there should be no ordinary electrical equipment within 25 feet of the gas and it should be at least 50 feet away from any air-conditioning equipment. 15 Elsewhere emphasis has been ]-76DICKERSON ET ATL. placed on the necessity for allowinig siufficient time to elapse between hydrogeni inhalatio-ns to permit its dispersion. Others have discuissed its use withouit referenec to a potential daniger.1 ,' 4It was therefore decided fu-rther to delineate the( exact niatture of the hydrogen hazard involved when this gas is employed in the cardiac catheterizationi laboratory for the detectioni of slhuni-its and to define iore clearly the extent of danger.
Materials and Methods
Initial tests were conduicted (luring rouitine cardiac catheterizations anid are cited as dlinical o1)servations. Subsequent determinations were made in ani artificial setting deliberately aimed at testing theb relative safety in uising hydrogeni uinder extremely adverse cir-cuinstances. These finidingcys are cited as experimental studies.
Clinical Observations
Twenty patients, 10 childreni and 10 aduilts, ranging from 2 to 28 years of age were given repeated sinigle inhalations of lhydrogen from a 5-liter rubber anesthetic bag in the catheterizationi laboratory. The gas wvas transferred from a stanidard 173-ft.:; cylinder of industrial hydrogen. This larger tank was preferred over smaller tacnks because in its portal)le stand it is mnore secure againist fallin(g or slipping wvhen its valves are opened ancd closed. The maisk was applied to the patient's face and at a gixven recorded manulal signal, the integral 2-way valve was opened. This exchanged hiydrogen for air at the beginning of inspiration. The valve was closed at the height of inispiratioin. At least eight different samples of the resultanit hydrogen-air mixture were taken at 2-inich distances laterally and above each patienit's mouth durinig initial and subsequeent exhalatiotns uintil only trace con.centrations were recorded. Samples were trapped in an inverted plastic cup having a voltme of 35 in.". This in turn was attached to a conventional hlydrogen Explosinmeter, Model 3* ( fig. 1 ). This is the inlstrulment Mine Safety Appliance Companmy, Pittsburgh, Pennsylv,ania.
Figure1
Jlydrogcnt Explosiielctr, AIodcl 3, a10d samp~~le COllect-i;tigSN de; B=iccwr uised to evaluiate the risk imiposed iby the geni 'ration of hydrogen inthe charging of sub mi-arine batteries.
The MSA' Explosimeteris basically a Wheatstone bridge, one leg of xhich is a platinum filament. ii' aspirator 1)111) (ras the sample of hy drogen -air inito a detectioni chamber \xxhere it is burned on the platinum filamenit. The addlitionial heat that is generated alters the resistance of this leg of the bridge anid the-degree of imbalanice that r-esuilts is proportional to the concentration of hydrogen in the air specimne tested. This value is read on an indicatiing meter as 0 to 4.1 per cent, ti latter figure being the IonT ci eXplosive limit of lhydrogenc in air.' 2 For the clin-iical observations, ai ordinary breath of hy(lrogen wNas uised. Th-is was adc-(plate to cause a prominiient chanige in the l)aseline of the initracaxvity electrocardiograi-i as recorded in the wedge position of thelhinm anid riglht pulnmoniary artery of a normisal patient ( fig. 2 ). On t 18 occasions,oa sedated buit cooperative patient wxas asked to "take a dee.(p breath" after the hydrogeni valve had been opened, especially if previous breathing bad been eirratic. The results in these instantces xTtre incluided in the 285 expiratory concei-i trationis myeasured. Usuially thiree conisecutive meter readinCgs vere takeni at 5to 10-secoindi intervals bft occasionallviy only txo x ecre recordedi.
Patiets xvere stuidied in a fasting state and Cleriliii., n. Volume XXXU, Af;lay 196.5 tunlder imild prenmedication from xxhich tlhey could be readily aroused. With an occasional child wxlo would niot tolerate the physical conltact of the face mask, it was held as close as possible to the face anid the lhydrogeni bag w as cominpressed during a normal inispiration as signaled iby tlhc respiratory tracinlg. This procedure also permnitted the recordiing of satisfactory curxcs. In these inistances, aspiratioin bIulbs xvere used to drav in samples l)clox\ the level of the monith.
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Experimental Studies
Repeated hydrogeni inlhalatioin;s were performed by 12 cooperative subjects in a carefully closed and unventilated 1,400-ft.8 room with a ceiling 10 feet high. The subjects' inspiratory voluimes xvere purposely varied from "9normal" to 5,000rml. of 1hydrogen, the latter by trained divers. At least six serial samples of the resultant hydrogeni-air mixture xvere taken at 2-inich distanices above, lateral, anid beloxx the monitlh of each patienit (diring the initial Suibsequiently, to evaluate the relative concentration of lhydrogen at uipper roomi levels, 150 liters of hydrogen xvere released in 5-liter increments from the patient level inito the atmosplhecre during a 4-m-inute period, and samlples xvere tested for aIn explosive concentration at 6-iclh levels fromI the 10-foot ceilinay doxxwnxx ard. Thereafter, 200 liters of hydrogen Table 1 Mean Percentage Concentrations of Hydrogen in Air After an Ordinary Breath of Hydrogen Distance above mouth in inches Samples were collected and tested at points directly over the mouths of 10 adult patients at distances and time intervals as indicated. Expl, explosive hydrogen in air concentrations; Tr, trace only of hydrogen in air. were released during a 5-minute period under the same circumstances after the room had been aired. Finally, after 5-liter ejections of hydrogen directed toward the ceiling, the nature and extent of the resultant explosion zone were actually tested with an acetylene igniter (sparking device).
Results
Clinical Observations in the Catheterization Laboratory
The average hydrogen concentrations in air as measured at variable distances and times following the onset of hydrogen-air expiration are recorded in table 1 and a graphic representation of the maximal zone of risk induced is shown in figure 3 . It is thus apparent that the zone of risk did not extend more than 12 inches above the patient's mouth or exceed 4 inches in any lateral direction from his mouth.
These maximal measurements were taken with adult patients. The variations encountered from one patient to another were understandably dependent on the quantity of gas inhaled and the force of the air-hydrogen exhalations. In general, contracted explosion zones were found in children which correlated well with their lesser tidal volumes. When, under the most extreme circumstances, hydrogen was forcibly expressed downward from the anesthetic bag without touching the face of the patient after the manner of Hugenholtz et al.6 an explosive concentration was never encountered at a depth greater than 4 inches below the level of the patient's mouth, more than 6 inches in any lateral direction and more than 10 inches directly above the point of release.
Experimental Studies in 1,400-ft.3 Unventilated Room
Under conditions of normal consciousness and normal breathing, the duration and ex- 14" I12 " 1 Shaded area shows meaximal extene of explosive concentrotion of hydrogen during initial expiration after hydrogen inhoaltion in adult patients.
Figure 3
Maximum zone of risk.
Circulation, Volume XXXI, May 1965 SAFETY OF HYDROGEN tent of the explosion zone did nol nificantly from that observed in I catheterization laboratory. Theref attempt to define the maximal pos of an explosive zone in terms of di extent, six cooperative, robust, a( water divers repeatedly inhaled liter bagful of hydrogen in a sir and, again, serial determinations ( centrations of the exhaled mixl recorded. The difference between tial explosion zone in the catheter oratory under resting conditions in in an artificial setting under extr tions with 5,000-ml. inhalations o is depicted in figure 4 . Even with halation and with the subject turnii to the side, explosive concentrat be recorded for only 25 seconds a not exceeding 18 inches laterally an directly over the mouth.
When checked with an acetyl( hydrogen, which was forcefully ward the ceiling, ignited in a flar turned to the anesthetic bag at d to 30 inches but not beyond. Figure 4 Zone A: Maximum danger zone in pal following an ordinary breath of hydroW Maximum danger zone induced after in ml. of hydrogen followed by forcible ur tion. t differ sigthe cardiac Fore, in an ,sible limits uration and dult underthe full 5igle breath of the contures were the potenization labadults and eme condif hydrogen forceful exng his head tions could it distances was produced which did not return to the source of hydrogen ejection.
Five liters of hydrogen released from a 40inch level in an upward direction arrived at the ceiling after 3 seconds where it registered 0.7 per cent. A measurable concentration persisted for approximately 6 seconds. Following the direct release of 150 liters of hydrogen in 4 minutes the maximum hydrogen concentration reached at the ceiling was 1.6 per cent directly overhead. The corresponding value after the release of 200 liters of hydrogen in 5 minutes was 1.8 per cent. Therefore overhead conventional electrical apparatus (incandescent lights) did not constitute an explosive hazard under the extreme conditions imposed in the small, unventilated room used. 
Summary
The hazards of hydrogen as used for the detection of shunts has been studied under clinical conditions with the Standard Mine Safety Appliance Explosimeter and under additional simulated circumstances far more extreme than would ever be encountered in a catheterization laboratory. Because of the lightness of the gas and its ready diffusibility, explosive concentrations were transiently identified in small zones that were grossly different from those reportedly associated with "heavier than air" explosive gases. With its use in single inhalations for the identification of an intracardiac shunt and with allowances for a liberal safety factor, no explosive risk exists outside a conical envelope, xvhich may be considered to extend 3 feet above, 6 inches below, and 12 inches laterally in all directions from the patient's mouth. Ordinary electronic apparatus, motor-driven syringes, and x-ray equipment, provided they are commonly grounded and outside this zone, require no explosive safety precautions in their use when hydrogen is used in this manner for shunt detection. Room ventilation is desirable for personal comfort but should not be considered a safety requirement. Release of large quantities of hydrogen has shown that there is no reason to specify a time interval between inhalations for the dispersion of hydrogen.
These conclusions are not intended to bemean those measures that are routinely followed to avoid the generation of static electricity.16 But were a spark generated, it would be of no significance unless it occurred in the restricted zone described.
